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Graduate Labor Mismatch in Poland 




This paper investigates education-labor mismatch for university graduates in Poland 
using the HEGESCO survey. Mismatch refers to the level of discord between the job 
performed by an individual and its education and skills. We evaluate three different 
dimensions of mismatch: vertical (under-/over-education), horizontal (wrong field of 
study for the job performed), and skills mismatch (under-/over-skilled). We discuss 
our results in the light of the large increase in the demand for tertiary education as 
well as in the number of tertiary education institutions that occurred in Poland after 
the transition process from communism to market economy. 
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The economic and sociological importance of education-job match has been recognized for 
decades (Brixiova, Li, and Yousef 2009; Freeman 1976; Kalleberg and Sorensen 1979) and 
today remains on the center of the stage in labor sociology and labor economics (Budría and 
Moro-Egido 2009; Groot and Brink 2000; Handel 2003; Hartog 2000; Korpi and Tahlin 2009; 
Kucel 2011). During those three decades, the education-job mismatch has been thoroughly 
studied in both sociological (Halaby 1994; Witte and Kalleberg 1995; Wolbers 2003) as well 
as economic literature (Chevalier 2003; Green and Zhu 2010; McGuinness 2006). However, 
almost all this research has concentrated on the Western Europe and the US. There is 
almost no evidence on education-job mismatch in Eastern Europe (Kogan and Unt 2005; 
Lamo and Messina 2010).  
This paper aims at filling this gap by investigating education-labor mismatch in Poland using 
a unique and very rich dataset from the HEGESCO survey. Education-labor mismatch refers 
to the level of discord between the job performed by an individual and its education and 
skills. This data permits us to evaluate three different dimensions of mismatch: vertical 
(under-/over-education), horizontal (wrong field of study for the job performed), and skills 
mismatch (under-/over-skilled). We estimate the likelihood of each of these mismatches 
with respect to fields of study, competencies and types of university program studied 
(broad, vocational, academically prestigious etc.). 
Our results show important differences between fields of study and the likelihood of vertical 
mismatch which can be traced back to the labor force composition in Poland during the 
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economic transition and shortly after it. We also show that some competencies are much 
more “successful” in the Polish labor market than others with respect to education-job 
matching. Furthermore, we demonstrate that having studied an academically prestigious 
program or one which employers are familiar with improves both skills mismatch and 
horizontal mismatch. We believe these characteristics reflect differences across universities, 
which have seen a large increase in numbers after transition. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background to our 
analysis. Section 3 describes the data and methods used and Section 4 presents the results. 
Finally, conclusions are discussed in Section 5.  
2. Theoretical background 
Three decades of research on education-job mismatch have demonstrated that it is a highly 
undesirable phenomenon in the labor market. First of all, mismatched workers tend to 
receive a lower pay than if they were matched (Chevalier and Lindley 2009; Dolton and Silles 
2008; Lamo and Messina 2010; McGuinness 2006). Moreover, growth of their wages is 
slower than of their matched peers (Buchel and Mertens 2004; Lindley and McIntosh 2010). 
Mismatched workers have also been shown to receive less training than matched workers 
which in turn may affect their career mobility (Buchel and Mertens 2004; Smoorenburg and 
Velden 2000). Furthermore, mismatch leads to decreased job satisfaction (Allen and Velden 
2001; Garcia-Aracil 2009; McGuinness and Sloane 2010) and affects negatively workers’ 
productivity (Tsang 1987; Tsang, Rumberger, and Levin 1991). A recent paper by de Grip, 
Willems and van Boxtel (2008) also demonstrates that working in a mismatched job may 
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have a detrimental influence on workers’ cognitive ability. Finally, sociological research 
points out that mismatch may actually push into unemployment the less skilled and less 
educated individuals (Aberg 2003; Borghans and de Grip 2000; Kalleberg 1977). All these 
adverse effects of mismatch may seriously alter social mobility (Buchel 2001; Kucel 2011). 
Given the bulk of evidence of the negative effects of mismatch on various socio-economic 
outcomes, it is surprising how little is known on mismatch in Eastern European countries 
(Domanski 2005; Kogan and Unt 2005; Saar, Unt, and Kogan 2008).  
The transition process from state socialism to a market economy caused a long period of 
opacity in the Eastern European labor markets (Solga and Konietzka 1999; Spence 1973; 
Thurow 1974). This process could be described as a two phase phenomenon with respect to 
matching in the labor market (Roberts 1998; Roberts and Szumlicz 1995). The first phase 
was characterized by a deep economic crisis with high inflation and elevated unemployment 
(Plessz 2009). The most important change was the growth of the new service sector and a 
relative reduction of the industrial sector (Jeong, Kejak, and Vinogradov 2008; Solga and 
Diewald 2001). The main consequence of these changes was a shortage of skilled labor for 
the service sector, which led to educational expansion aimed to fulfill those employment 
needs. For those workers who ended up in the service sector this meant rapid upward 
mobility and employment in under-educated or under-skilled positions, while many workers 
from the industrial sector suffered long unemployment spells and skills depreciation (Cazes 
and Nesporova 2003; Diewald, Solga, and Goedicke 2002).  
The second phase of the transition process with respect to education-job mismatch could be 
observed since 1995-1998 when the first cohorts of adequately skilled labor for the service 
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sector entered the labor market and the pace of growth of skilled jobs in the service sector 
slowed down. This new situation led to an excess of educated workers and, consequently, 
caused some students to prolong their studies and delay their entry into the labor market 
(Helemäe and Saar 2000; Saar, Unt, and Kogan 2008).  
We investigate the existence and determinants of education-job mismatch in Poland for the 
cohort of graduates from 2003. This cohort entered the labor market in a society considered 
by Slomczynski et al. (2007) a “typical capitalist society” with much more highly meritocratic 
employment and remuneration rules than under the previous state socialist system 
(Domanski 2010). The Polish tertiary education system was, however, strongly shaped by 
the preceding transition period. Young graduates who entered the Polish labor market in 
2003 had started their university studies in the second phase of the economic transition, 
namely in the end of nineties. By then, the education system in Poland responded to the 
increase demand of tertiary education with a flourishing amount of private tertiary 
institutions (Svejnar 1999). By the time our sample graduated, Poland had 427 tertiary 
education institutions, which is 4.4 times as much as in 1989 when there were 97 tertiary 
institutions in Poland. A grand majority of these institutions were private (301 out of 427). 
As regards the number of graduates in both private and public institutions, the numbers 
grew by 680% between 1990 and 2003 from 56000 to 384000. Moreover, more than 40% of 
those graduates obtained their diplomas in social sciences, business and law, while only 
3.9% of graduates finished Sciences studies (Fulton et al. 2007, p. 18-19). All these changes 
in the Polish tertiary education were mostly a response to the raise in demand for higher 
education, while little effort was made to attune programs to the skills demanded in the 
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labor market. The strong detachment between universities and labor market in Poland and 
the large supply of newly created tertiary education institutions made it more difficult for 
employers to screen the large pool of graduates. In this context, program characteristics 
such as academic prestige or employer familiarity with the content, gained importance in 
determining the education-labor mismatch of the graduates. 
The scarce existing evidence on Eastern Europe shows that Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary 
did not escape the trap of education-job mismatch, so well-known in Western Europe and 
the US (Brunello, Garibaldi, and Wasmer 2007; Kogan and Unt 2005; Lamo and Messina 
2010).  
Although in our study we cannot observe whether an individual graduated from a public or 
private institution, we have a battery of program characteristics which allow us to analyze 
which of them allowed their graduates to avoid education-job mismatches. A priori we 
expect to observe that prestigious and well known programs should diminish the likelihood 
of mismatch together with science and vocational types of programs. Contrary to that social 
sciences are expected to prove rather “unsuccessful” in matching their graduates to jobs 
since most of the expansion in private institutions was directed towards this field of study.  
3.  Data description and methodology 
Data description 
We use HEGESCO survey for Poland in our analysis. HEGESCO survey includes also 
information on Slovenia, Turkey, Lithuania and Hungary. It consists of a representative 
sample of ISCED5A graduates who got their degree in the academic year 2002/2003. Data 
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collection took place five years after graduation, in 2008. A questionnaire was sent by mail 
asking about their educational and career experience during five years since graduation, 
giving a quasi-longitudinal character to the data. The response rate in Poland was 20%, 
which corresponds to 1.200 observations (Allen and Van der Velden 2009).1  
We use three dependent variables measuring different types of labor mismatch: vertical, 
horizontal and skills mismatch. Vertical mismatch refers to three possible categories: under-
educated if the respondent considered his/her job required more education than s/he 
currently possessed, matched if the respondent considered his/her level of education 
adequate for his/her present job, and over-educated if the respondent considered s/he had 
more education than required by the job. Horizontal mismatch refers to the adequacy of the 
field of study to the current job. The worker is considered to be horizontally matched if own 
or related field was the most appropriate for the present job, and horizontally mismatched 
when completely other or no specific field was required according to the respondent. The 
third dependent variable measures the level of skill mismatch. When the respondent 
considers that his/her knowledge and skills are little utilized in his/her current job, then s/he 
is regarded as over-skilled. Instead, when the respondent feels that the current work 
demands more knowledge and skills than s/he can offer, then s/he is coded as under-skilled. 
If s/he is neither over-skilled nor under-skilled, s/he is matched in terms of skills. Certainly, 
this kind of measures of education-job mismatches is not free from possible flaws. The 
major criticism of the measure used here is that it may reflect worker’s subjective desires 
more than the real mismatch situation. Other measures based on statistical approximations 
of educational requirements of job across occupations have also been heavily criticized. At 
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the moment there is no consensus in the mismatch literature which measures are clearly 
better and the choice is usually determined by data availability (Chevalier 2003; Halaby 
1994; McGuinness and Sloane 2010).  
As explanatory variables we use standard individual and job characteristics, fields of study 
and six characteristics of the study program (whether it was demanding, vocationally 
oriented, broad in content, academically prestigious, employers were familiar with content 
and there was freedom to compose own program). The characteristics of the study program 
are a 5-level Likert-type scale variable. As we have discussed before, program characteristics 
used in this paper are crucial controls for the model in order to tackle the relative quality 
differences of skills signal across different tertiary schools in Poland.  
Further, we construct five indexes of competencies based on a battery of questions 
regarding individuals’ self-perception of nineteen facets spanning from knowledge of their 
own field, through ability to coordinate activities, negotiate, use time efficiently, to 
knowledge of foreign language (Garcia-Aracil and Van der Velden 2008). Every facet of 
competency was measured on 7-level Likert-type scale with 1 indicating the lowest level of 
competency in that facet and 7 the highest. Table 1 presents the groupings of all nineteen 
facets into indexes based on a factor analysis and their corresponding Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients of reliability. Each index was later standardized to mean 0 and variance 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
After excluding all missing cases, as well as self-employed and part-time workers (those who 
worked less than 20 hours per week)2, and those above 65 years old, we are left with 720 
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valid cases for our analysis. Table 2 reports the basic statistics for all the variables used in 
the analysis. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Around 22% of university graduates are under-educated in Poland, a number much higher 
than in Western European countries due to the transition process as explained in the 
theoretical discussion. Around 15% of university graduates are over-educated, a figure more 
in line with results found in Western European countries. Under-skilling is also large in 
Poland (close to 40%), with only 8% of respondents reporting over-skilling. With regards to 
horizontal mismatch, around 18% of university graduates work in a job that does not 
require the field of study of their university program. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the average reported amount of competencies for vertical and skill 
mismatch, respectively. The main differences occur for the over-educated and over-skilled 
individuals, who report lower level of competencies than the rest of individuals (Figures 1 
and 2). This observation is in line with recent studies which argue that those individuals who 
get over-educated are missing skills of some type (Chevalier and Lindley 2009; Garcia-Aracil 
and Van der Velden 2008; Green and McIntosh 2007; Heijke, Meng, and Ris 2003; 
Hernandez-March, Martin del Peso, and Leguey 2009). There is no significant difference in 
competencies between those horizontally matched and mismatched. 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Similarly, figures 3 and 4 show the average program characteristics level reported for skills 
and horizontal mismatch, respectively. On average, over-skilled and horizontally 
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mismatched individuals report having studied a worse program. There are no significant 
differences in program characteristics for vertical mismatch.  
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
Methodology 
Given the categorical nature of the dependent variables we employ multinomial logistic 
models for vertical and skills mismatch and a logistic model for the horizontal mismatch. A 
similar modeling approach has been used in Kogan and Unt (2005) for studying vertical 
mismatch in Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary. Multinomial logistic model permits us to assess 
the relative impact of explanatory variables such as competencies or fields of study on the 
dependent variable education-job mismatch with respect to the matched workers category. 
The relative impact of particular competencies on the likelihood of being under-/over-
educated or under-/over-skilled is estimated in comparison to the group of correctly 
matched workers (those who work in jobs requiring their education level or skills level). For 
the horizontal mismatch, whereby workers are employed in jobs requiring different field of 
study than their achieved field, we use logistic regression and compare relative likelihood of 
being horizontally mismatched with respect to the reference category of correctly allocated 
workers. These techniques allow us to determine which competencies and fields of study 
increase or decrease the likelihood of education-job mismatch in Poland in the year 2008.  
In the base model (Model 1) we introduce a battery of explanatory variables entailing 
individual characteristics such as gender, age, average grade in secondary education (a 
proxy for ability), education level, fields of study, control if student participated in an 
internship and job characteristics, such as tenure, firm size, three dummies for aggregate 
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occupations and three dummies for aggregate sectors.3 In Model 2 we extend the previous 
analysis by introducing the measures on competencies. Model 3 extends the base model by 
adding the program characteristics in the equation. Finally, Model 4 introduces both sets of 
variables together, competencies and program characteristics. 
4. Results 
In this section we present the econometric results for vertical mismatch, skills mismatch and 
horizontal mismatch. First we analyze the vertical dimension of education-job mismatch 
referring to whether an individual possesses too much or too little formal education as 
compared to the required level. Next we move on to analysis of skills mismatch, again 
distinguishing between over-skilling and under-skilling for the job. Finally, we analyze 
horizontal mismatch, whereby workers report if their job requires their field of study or it 
requires some completely other field or no field.  
Vertical mismatch 
Table 3 reports the coefficients for the multinomial logistic estimation for vertical mismatch. 
We explain a large part of vertical mismatch as pseudo R-squares for these estimations 
show (around 40%). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Results reveal that having studied Social Sciences or Sciences and Mathematics improve the 
chances of being under-educated while it decreases the chances of being over-educated 
with respect to Engineering.4 These results are consistent with the fact that few students 
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graduate from Sciences and Mathematics, which facilitates their finding adequate jobs or 
even more demanding jobs as compared to their level of education. Social Sciences keep 
being a good field of study as for vertical mismatch, indicating that the labor market for this 
type of graduates did not saturate yet in Poland. 
Once we introduce competencies in the model (Model 2), we observe that executive skills 
clearly help in avoiding over-education, while communication skills make it more likely to 
become under-educated. These are, therefore, valuable skills for the Polish labor market. 
From Model 3 we see that program characteristics do not matter to explain vertical 
mismatch.  
The rest of the variables behave as expected. Average grade in secondary education 
increases chances of being under-educated and decreases chances to be over-educated. 
Having higher education level makes it easier to become over-educated, and decreases odds 
of under-education. Participation in an internship helps in getting an under-educated job. 
Finally, being a female or working in a big firm decreases the likelihood of being over-
educated. While the latter is consistent with the literature on over-education, gender 
results could be explained by a strong selection mechanism on those female students that 
finish university degree and get to the labor market.  
Skills mismatch 
Results on skills mismatch are presented in Table 4. Results reveal that graduates from 
Education and Agriculture studies feel themselves more under-skilled in their jobs than 
engineering graduates. Their study program adapted to the new labor market to the lowest 
degree and, similarly as in the Western Europe, does not equip their graduates with very 
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“marketable” skills (Ortiz and Kucel 2008). The rest of fields of study do not seem to 
influence the probability of skills mismatch in Poland. 
Graduates with good enterprising and communication skills are less likely to become over-
skilled. However, the variable “knowledge” increases chances for an over-skilled job. These 
results hold even when program characteristics are included in the estimation. Having 
strong knowledge of your field and the ability to acquire new knowledge does not help in 
obtaining a job matching your skills. In contrast, ability to communicate and being alert to 
opportunities are important in this respect.  
When employers are familiar with the program, the program was vocationally oriented and 
academically prestigious, the probability of over-skilling decreases. Moreover, in Model 4, 
having studied a vocationally oriented program also helps in avoiding feeling under-skilled 
at work. These results emphasize the importance of the type of tertiary education 
institution for skill mismatch. Those graduates from well-established programs known by 
employers or closely linked to the labor market (vocational) were more likely to obtain a job 
adequate to their skills. This finding might suggest (although it needs much more profound 
examination) that employers in Poland tend to value more programs which have been 
present in the country’s education system for long, namely the programs offered by the 
public and perhaps some few very selected private tertiary institutions. This line of research 
requires clearly a further investigation. 





The main variables influencing the probability of horizontal mismatch are fields of study and 
program characteristics, as reported in Table 5. Notice that the Health field of study was 
dropped from the analysis because all graduates in Health reported being horizontally 
matched. In contrast, the worse field in terms of horizontal match is Humanities, which 
increases the chances of being horizontally mismatched even when controlling for program 
characteristics. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Although Social Sciences and Services increase the likelihood of horizontal mismatch in 
models 1 and 2, the significance disappears once program characteristics are introduced. 
Academically prestigious programs and employers’ familiarity with them are the 
characteristics that decrease the probability of working outside one’s own field of study. 
This is again related to the type of tertiary education institution. Those universities that 
manage to achieve or maintain a certain level of prestige and were trusted by employers 
achieved better outcomes for their graduates in terms of horizontal match. 
In contrast to fields of study and program characteristics, competencies do not show any 
significant effect on horizontal mismatch. From individual variables, only average grade on 




The goal of the paper was to understand the determinants of education-labor mismatch in 
Poland. This paper contributes to a very scarce literature on mismatch in the Eastern Europe 
(Kogan and Unt 2005; Lamo and Messina 2010). Labor mismatch on Eastern Europe is 
inevitably affected by the transition process and the expansion of both, the demand for 
tertiary education and the number of tertiary education institutions.  
The emerging picture is that some fields of study, notably Mathematics and Sciences as well 
as Social sciences have proven to be the winning horse in the race for the best education-
job match in the late years of Polish transition. Also, being entrepreneurial and having 
executive and communication skills showed to be a good “equipment” for the graduates in 
those turbulent times. These observations are very similar in fact to those for the Western 
Europe. It could signalize that Poland indeed could be considered yet another fully capitalist 
society (Slomczynski, Janicka, Shabad, and Tomescu-Dubrow 2007). The bottom line is, 
however, that Poland unlike her western peers in the EU has a high level of under-education 
and under-skilling. This seems to be related to the large expansion in the number of tertiary 
education institutions during the last decade, which obscured the signal of educational 
credentials in Poland and provoked that graduates from those universities with good 
reputation find themselves in a relatively strongly advantageous position with respect to 
their peers from less prestigious schools. Although majority of our sample is very young 
some individuals might have started working in the earlier phase of the transition and 
enrolled into the university studies later (Roberts 1998). This also could have added to the 
levels of under-education and under-skilling in our results. 
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Further research should be devoted to how the different types of mismatch affect labor 
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Table 1. Indexes of competencies and competency facets comprising each index. 
Index Competency facets Cronbach’s 
alpha 
knowledgeable mastery of own field or discipline 
knowledge of other field or disciplines 




executive ability to negotiate effectively 
ability to perform well under pressure 
 
α=0.62 
leadership ability to coordinate activities 
ability to use time efficiently 
ability to work productively with others  
ability to mobilize the capacities of others 
ability to make your meaning clear to others 
ability to exert authority 
 
α=0.84 
enterprising alertness to new opportunities 
ability to come up with new ideas and solutions 
willingness to question your own and others’ ideas 
ability to use computers and internet 
 
α=0.77 
communication ability to present products, ideas or reports to an audience 
ability to write reports, memos or documents ability to write 
and speak in a foreign language 
 
α=0.62 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Educational mismatch 720 1.926389 0.6140436 1 3 
Skills mismatch 720 1.701389 0.6114333 1 3 
Horizontal mismatch 720 0.1791667 0.3837584 0 1 
Education 720 0.0736111 0.2613185 0 1 
Humanities 720 0.0263889 0.1604003 0 1 
Social Sciences 720 0.4388889 0.4965964 0 1 
Science & Math 720 0.0583333 0.2345356 0 1 
Engineering 720 0.2291667 0.4205889 0 1 
Agriculture & Vet 720 0.0638889 0.2447249 0 1 
Health 720 0.0388889 0.1934645 0 1 
Services 720 0.0708333 0.2567246 0 1 
gradsecPL 720 3.734722 1.017464 1 5 
Internship 720 0.7791667 0.4150967 0 1 
Female 720 0.5722222 0.4951004 0 1 
Age 720 30.12917 3.01295 23 52 
Tenure 720 48.20833 41.17449 0 357 
firmsizeG_2 720 0.2916667 0.4548456 0 1 
firmsizeG_3 720 0.4597222 0.4987215 0 1 
edulvlG_1 720 0.2625 0.4402988 0 1 
edulvlG_2 720 0.7375 0.4402988 0 1 
Leadership 720 5.36088 0.9401691 2.33 7 
Executive 720 4.927083 1.222996 1 7 
Knowledge 720 5.152083 0.9342776 2 7 
Enterprising 720 5.553125 0.8708544 2.75 7 
Communication 720 4.801852 1.203815 1 7 
Demanding 720 3.168056 1.043335 1 5 
Employer familiar 720 2.856944 1.283394 1 5 
Freedom 720 2.434722 1.255271 1 5 
Broad 720 3.525 1.021024 1 5 
Vocational 720 3.294444 1.087019 1 5 




Table 3. Coefficients for the multinomial logistic estimation on vertical mismatch. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 undered overed undered overed undered overed undered overed 
Education 0.981 -0.475 1.098 -0.412 0.948 -0.603 1.028 -0.531 
 (0.747) (0.567) (0.756) (0.588) (0.749) (0.585) (0.761) (0.604) 
Humanities -1.257 -1.600 -1.192 -1.602 -1.491* -1.469 -1.444 -1.528 
 (0.822) (1.121) (0.861) (1.131) (0.860) (1.115) (0.898) (1.134) 
Social Sciences 0.731 -0.535* 0.780 -0.448 0.836* -0.606* 0.860* -0.495 
 (0.468) (0.309) (0.484) (0.322) (0.499) (0.326) (0.513) (0.337) 
Science & Math 1.940*** -1.622** 1.907*** -1.749** 2.159*** -1.700** 2.086*** -1.836*** 
 (0.680) (0.677) (0.707) (0.701) (0.699) (0.687) (0.722) (0.712) 
Agriculture & Vet -1.264 0.0340 -1.361 -0.0510 -1.567 -0.131 -1.681 -0.188 
 (1.549) (0.416) (1.555) (0.430) (1.696) (0.445) (1.707) (0.467) 
Health 1.418 -1.130 1.498 -1.245 1.431 -1.122 1.526 -1.263 
 (0.891) (0.821) (0.938) (0.830) (0.899) (0.827) (0.954) (0.838) 
Services 0.702 -0.665 0.952 -0.638 0.366 -0.774 0.617 -0.707 
 (0.661) (0.492) (0.670) (0.499) (0.703) (0.503) (0.715) (0.509) 
Grade sec. 0.388** -0.288** 0.300* -0.247** 0.450*** -0.277** 0.360** -0.248** 
 (0.154) (0.119) (0.159) (0.125) (0.157) (0.120) (0.163) (0.125) 
ISCED5a & 6 -5.467*** 0.875* -5.631*** 0.778* -5.676*** 0.914** -5.808*** 0.802* 
 (0.434) (0.457) (0.457) (0.458) (0.471) (0.460) (0.491) (0.460) 
Internship 0.738* 0.222 0.701* 0.141 0.750* 0.228 0.699 0.156 
 (0.422) (0.312) (0.424) (0.316) (0.434) (0.316) (0.436) (0.320) 
Female 0.594 -0.613** 0.599 -0.729*** 0.539 -0.648** 0.530 -0.758*** 
 (0.370) (0.252) (0.378) (0.267) (0.381) (0.256) (0.391) (0.270) 
Age -0.0305 0.0112 -0.0292 0.00996 -0.0321 0.0141 -0.0323 0.0143 
 (0.077) (0.047) (0.078) (0.048) (0.085) (0.047) (0.086) (0.048) 
Tenure 0.00538 0.00191 0.00576 0.00174 0.00459 0.00249 0.00513 0.00203 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
firmsizeG_2 0.287 -0.168 0.295 -0.111 0.376 -0.185 0.356 -0.120 
 (0.451) (0.305) (0.457) (0.312) (0.464) (0.308) (0.471) (0.315) 
firmsizeG_3 0.516 -0.646** 0.519 -0.537* 0.606 -0.703** 0.577 -0.574* 
 (0.416) (0.298) (0.431) (0.308) (0.435) (0.305) (0.451) (0.315) 
Leadership   -0.145 0.146   -0.136 0.164 
   (0.247) (0.173)   (0.251) (0.175) 
Executive   -0.277 -0.386**   -0.277 -0.395*** 
   (0.215) (0.151)   (0.222) (0.153) 
Knowledge   0.183 0.0261   0.132 0.0547 
   (0.223) (0.166)   (0.224) (0.170) 
Enterprising   0.120 -0.162   0.129 -0.161 
   (0.237) (0.181)   (0.240) (0.185) 
Communication   0.338* -0.102   0.355* -0.108 
   (0.203) (0.152)   (0.210) (0.155) 
Demanding     -0.211 0.0285 -0.207 0.0516 
     (0.175) (0.136) (0.177) (0.139) 
24 
 
Employer familiar     0.107 0.0756 0.123 0.0925 
     (0.137) (0.103) (0.140) (0.105) 
Freedom     -0.0120 0.0295 -0.00948 0.0549 
     (0.139) (0.101) (0.143) (0.105) 
Broad     -0.277 -0.0254 -0.284 -0.0328 
     (0.174) (0.135) (0.182) (0.137) 
Vocational     0.241 -0.0551 0.226 -0.0468 
     (0.169) (0.129) (0.171) (0.131) 
Prestigious     0.145 -0.205* 0.130 -0.168 
     (0.168) (0.123) (0.170) (0.125) 
_cons -0.210 -0.873 0.118 -0.940 -0.219 -0.450 0.259 -0.820 
 (2.429) (1.597) (2.452) (1.642) (2.818) (1.669) (2.834) (1.736) 
N 720  720  720  720  
pseudo R2 0.389  0.405  0.398  0.413  
AIC 892.2  890.8  904.0  904.4  
BIC 1075.4  1119.8  1142.1  1188.3  
chi2 516.4  537.7  528.6  548.1  
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Reference category for fields of study: Engineering.  








Table 4. Coefficients for the multinomial logistic estimation on skill mismatch. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 underskill overskill underskill overskill underskill overskill underskill overskill 
Education 0.735* 0.565 0.729* 0.535 0.805** 0.377 0.779** 0.397 
 (0.382) (0.740) (0.383) (0.767) (0.389) (0.785) (0.390) (0.809) 
Humanities -0.789 0.372 -0.837 0.160 -0.804 0.466 -0.847 0.361 
 (0.614) (0.899) (0.618) (0.935) (0.620) (0.911) (0.625) (0.940) 
Social Sciences 0.0823 0.139 0.0628 0.0626 0.0477 -0.438 0.0145 -0.478 
 (0.235) (0.448) (0.238) (0.470) (0.247) (0.496) (0.250) (0.513) 
Science & Math -0.0858 0.539 -0.144 0.436 -0.199 0.178 -0.279 0.0634 
 (0.396) (0.634) (0.400) (0.658) (0.402) (0.687) (0.407) (0.710) 
Agriculture & Vet 0.923** 1.332** 0.874** 1.290** 1.019** 1.057 0.965** 1.067 
 (0.377) (0.611) (0.382) (0.626) (0.397) (0.673) (0.403) (0.695) 
Health -0.00755 0.472 -0.00412 0.306 -0.0120 0.579 -0.00936 0.684 
 (0.471) (0.881) (0.474) (0.902) (0.478) (0.937) (0.482) (0.949) 
Services 0.277 0.532 0.288 0.380 0.324 0.263 0.325 0.159 
 (0.355) (0.606) (0.357) (0.623) (0.360) (0.644) (0.362) (0.673) 
Grade sec. 0.0561 -0.352** 0.0568 -0.249* 0.0469 -0.339** 0.0482 -0.237 
 (0.084) (0.144) (0.088) (0.151) (0.085) (0.152) (0.089) (0.158) 
ISCED5a & 6 -0.134 -0.0824 -0.123 -0.204 -0.146 -0.0779 -0.128 -0.253 
 (0.191) (0.340) (0.192) (0.346) (0.194) (0.353) (0.196) (0.361) 
Internship 0.0874 -0.615* 0.137 -0.604* 0.115 -0.629* 0.175 -0.608 
 (0.220) (0.351) (0.224) (0.362) (0.222) (0.371) (0.226) (0.384) 
Female -0.0362 -0.218 -0.0334 -0.264 -0.0305 -0.185 -0.0368 -0.251 
 (0.183) (0.322) (0.186) (0.342) (0.185) (0.339) (0.188) (0.363) 
Age -0.00341 -0.0866 -0.00500 -0.100 0.00100 -0.0877 -0.000409 -0.125 
 (0.036) (0.079) (0.036) (0.083) (0.036) (0.083) (0.036) (0.089) 
Tenure -0.00322 -0.00207 -0.00344 -0.00250 -0.00279 -0.000322 -0.00299 0.0000948 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
firmsizeG_2 -0.105 -0.0914 -0.105 -0.0111 -0.101 -0.244 -0.0969 -0.236 
 (0.226) (0.445) (0.228) (0.456) (0.228) (0.473) (0.230) (0.482) 
firmsizeG_3 0.0392 0.396 0.0465 0.563 0.0485 0.205 0.0586 0.341 
 (0.211) (0.385) (0.214) (0.401) (0.214) (0.412) (0.218) (0.428) 
Leadership   -0.0401 0.151   -0.0185 0.109 
   (0.127) (0.219)   (0.128) (0.231) 
Executive   0.0388 0.0220   0.0509 0.109 
   (0.110) (0.194)   (0.112) (0.202) 
Knowledge   0.193 0.396*   0.211* 0.464** 
   (0.118) (0.213)   (0.120) (0.224) 
Enterprising   -0.0264 -0.633***   -0.0247 -0.612*** 
   (0.129) (0.222)   (0.131) (0.236) 
Communication   -0.0993 -0.425**   -0.128 -0.493** 
   (0.108) (0.187)   (0.110) (0.199) 
Demanding     0.0823 -0.0749 0.0865 -0.0755 
     (0.091) (0.180) (0.091) (0.183) 
26 
 
Employers familiar     -0.0582 -0.424*** -0.0590 -0.451*** 
     (0.072) (0.139) (0.072) (0.143) 
Freedom     0.0314 -0.133 0.0369 -0.140 
     (0.071) (0.141) (0.072) (0.144) 
Broad     -0.0640 0.204 -0.0563 0.213 
     (0.091) (0.165) (0.092) (0.172) 
Vocational     -0.140 -0.351** -0.163* -0.359** 
     (0.089) (0.156) (0.091) (0.160) 
Prestigious     0.0165 -0.346** -0.00304 -0.326* 
     (0.085) (0.163) (0.087) (0.171) 
_cons -0.372 1.895 -0.352 1.848 -0.0305 5.158* 0.0687 5.858** 
 (1.191) (2.517) (1.196) (2.627) (1.275) (2.718) (1.278) (2.911) 
N 720  720  720  720  
pseudo R2 0.042  0.059  0.076  0.092  
AIC 1330.3  1328.4  1309.9  1309.1  
BIC 1513.5  1557.3  1548.0  1593.0  
chi2 54.84  76.79  99.23  120.1  
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Reference category for fields of study: Engineering. Coefficients for 






Table 5. Coefficients for the logistic estimation on horizontal mismatch. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Education 0.627 0.630 0.422 0.411 
 (0.489) (0.490) (0.511) (0.511) 
Humanities 1.620*** 1.475** 1.533*** 1.387** 
 (0.588) (0.593) (0.593) (0.600) 
Social Sciences 0.746** 0.669** 0.483 0.401 
 (0.330) (0.333) (0.349) (0.352) 
Science & Math 0.347 0.348 0.0627 0.0800 
 (0.513) (0.519) (0.534) (0.540) 
Agriculture & Vet 0.557 0.563 0.0641 0.0710 
 (0.489) (0.495) (0.529) (0.534) 
Services 0.885** 0.858* 0.734 0.713 
 (0.440) (0.441) (0.450) (0.452) 
Grade sec. -0.380*** -0.394*** -0.386*** -0.407*** 
 (0.103) (0.109) (0.106) (0.112) 
ISCED5a & 6 0.0560 0.0450 0.0766 0.0837 
 (0.240) (0.242) (0.247) (0.250) 
Internship -0.217 -0.194 -0.236 -0.202 
 (0.258) (0.262) (0.263) (0.267) 
Female 0.182 0.236 0.189 0.249 
 (0.231) (0.236) (0.238) (0.244) 
Age -0.00370 0.00348 0.00719 0.0133 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Tenure -0.00505 -0.00505 -0.00428 -0.00422 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
firmsizeG_2 0.155 0.119 0.0582 0.00893 
 (0.287) (0.289) (0.297) (0.300) 
firmsizeG_3 0.151 0.0935 0.0454 -0.0393 
 (0.270) (0.273) (0.279) (0.284) 
Leadership  -0.100  -0.103 
  (0.159)  (0.163) 
Executive  0.150  0.181 
  (0.141)  (0.142) 
Knowledge  0.105  0.161 
  (0.149)  (0.155) 
Enterprising  -0.169  -0.126 
  (0.158)  (0.163) 
Communication  0.109  0.0998 
  (0.138)  (0.142) 
28 
 
Demanding   -0.0732 -0.0561 
   (0.120) (0.120) 
Employer familiar   -0.202** -0.202** 
   (0.093) (0.094) 
Freedom   0.0774 0.0652 
   (0.094) (0.094) 
Broad   -0.0584 -0.0479 
   (0.115) (0.116) 
Vocational   -0.0408 -0.0404 
   (0.111) (0.113) 
Prestigious   -0.277** -0.311*** 
   (0.111) (0.114) 
_cons -0.627 -0.759 1.023 0.990 
 (1.454) (1.447) (1.543) (1.538) 
N 692 692 692 692 
pseudo R2 0.076 0.081 0.112 0.119 
AIC 653.3 659.9 641.0 646.2 
BIC 739.5 768.9 754.5 782.4 
chi2 50.42 53.77 74.70 79.45 
Dependent variable: Horizontal mismatch. 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Reference category for fields of study: Engineering. 
Health dropped due to perfect predictor (28 observations not used). Coefficients for 







Figure 1. Average level of competencies and vertical education mismatch. 
 
 
























Figure 3. Program characteristics and skill mismatch 
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